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In the Matter of William M. v. State of Nevada, 
124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 95 (November 26, 2008)1
Constitutional Law – Fifth Amendment Rights
Summary
Requirement that a juvenile incriminate himself to rebut certification presumption violates the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. 
Disposition/Outcome
NRS 62B.390(2)2 and (3)3 violates juvenile’s Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination.
Requirement that a juvenile incriminate himself to rebut certification presumption violates the Fifth
Amendment.  Overruling Marvin v. State4, in part. 
Factual and Procedural History
This is a consolidation of two matters for consideration.5
In re Williams
William, who was 17 years old at the time of the incident, was identified as the lookout during the
robbery of a Roberto’s Taco Shop.  William was charged with conspiracy to commit robbery, burglary while in
possession of a firearm, and robbery with the use of a deadly weapon.  William was certified as an adult under
NRS 62B.390(2) presumptive certification.  William filed an opposition to the State’s certification petition,
attaching juvenile psychological reports detailing William’s alcohol and drug abuse. 
At his certification hearing, William stipulated to prosecutive merit.  William argued that while there
was clear and convincing evidence regarding his substance abuse, he was unable to rebut the presumption of
adult certification by connected the substance abuse to the robbery because he denied any involvement.
William argued the court to assume a hypothetical situation that if he had been there, his actions would have
been influenced by his substance abuse.
The court orally responded that while William had clearly established a problem with substance abuse,
he had not established a direct nexus between his abuse and the alleged conduct.  The court reasoned that
assumption of a hypothetical situation would not amount to clear and convincing evidence.  William was
certified for criminal proceedings as an adult, pleaded not guilty, and timely filed his notice of appeal. 
1 By Elham Roohani
2 In relevant part NEV. REV. STAT. §62B.390(2)(b) reads “the juvenile court shall certify a child for proper criminal proceedings as an
adult to any court that would have jurisdiction to try the offense if committed by an adult. . . [a]n offense or attempted offense
involving the use or threatened use of a firearm.”
3 In relevant part NEV. REV. STAT. §62B.390(3)(b) reads “[t]he juvenile court shall not certify a child for criminal proceedings as an
adult . . . if the juvenile court specifically finds by clear and convincing evidence that. . . [t]he actions of the child were substantially
the result of the substance abuse or emotional or behavioral problems of the child and the substance abuse or emotional or behavioral
problems may be appropriately treated through the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
4 95 Nev. 836, 603 P.2d 1056
5 The Court consolidated the cases of In re Williams and In re Marques, as they raised similar issues as to the constitutionality of
Nevada’s presumptive certification provisions.
In re Marques
Marques, who was 17 years old at the time of the incident, was charged in relation to the armed robbery
of two individuals in a park.  Marques was charged with conspiracy to commit robbery, two counts of robbery
with the use of a deadly weapon, discharging a firearm, endangering a person, and possession of a firearm.
Marques was certified as an adult under NRS 62B.390(2) presumptive certification.  Marques filed an
opposition to the State’s certification petition, attaching court-ordered psychological reports detailing Marques’
drug abuse and developmental delays. 
At his certification hearing, Marques stipulated to prosecutive merit.  Marques argued that while there
was clear and convincing evidence regarding his substance abuse, he was unable to rebut the presumption of
adult certification by connected the substance abuse to the robbery because he denied any involvement.
Marques argued the court to assume a hypothetical situation that if he had been there, his actions would have
been influenced by his substance abuse.
The court held Marques had not established a direct nexus between his substance abuse and
developmental delays and the alleged conduct.  Marques was certified for criminal proceedings as an adult,
plead not guilty, and timely filed his notice of appeal.
Discussion
Appellants argue the presumptive certification violates Fifth Amendment rights against self-
incrimination by requiring them to admit guilt to rebut the presumption but not prohibiting use of that evidence
against them in subsequent proceedings.  The Court’s analysis begins by determining whether Fifth Amendment
protection extends to statements in juvenile proceedings, and then addresses the constitutionality of the statute.
Review of the constitutionality of a statute is de novo. 
The Fifth Amendment right applies in juvenile certification proceedings and such proceedings may elicit
inculpatory statements
The Court notes that the United States Supreme Court has “unequivocally extended”  Fifth Amendment
protections to juveniles in delinquency proceedings.6  Thus, the Court concluded that Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination extends to juveniles and inculpatory statements made in juvenile
proceedings.  Inculpatory statements are protected if they could be used to incriminate the juvenile is future
proceedings. 
NRS 62B.390(3)(b) requires admission to overcome rebuttable presumption
Under the NRS 62B.390(3)(b), the court must find by “clear and convincing evidence that. . . [t]he
actions of the child were substantially the result of the substance abuse or emotional or behavioral problems.”7
Relying on reasoning from Anthony Lee R. A Minor v. State,8 the court held that for a juvenile to rebut the
presumption, they would have to establish that substance abuse, emotional or behavioral problems,
“substantially influenced or contributed” to the criminal actions, they would in fact have to admit to the criminal
actions, thereby incriminating himself.  Further buttressing their opinion is the practice of the juvenile court
requiring juveniles to establish a direct nexus between the substance abuse, emotional, or behavioral problems
to the charged conduct.  Therefore, for Williams or Marques to rebut the presumption that their intoxication the
night of the incident “substantially influenced or contributed” to the criminal actions, they would have to admit
first that they were present during the incident. 
Incriminating statements may be used in later proceedings
6 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967).
7 NEV. REV. STAT. §62B.390(3)(b)
8 113 Nev. 1406, 1416 (Nev. 1997).
In Marvin v. State,9 a juvenile made statements while in detention about his participation in several
burglaries.  In a later proceeding and based on the incriminating statements made prior, the State filed additional
burglary charges. Recognizing the dilemma and violation of Fifth Amendment rights, the Court overruled
Marvin in part.  Specifically, Marvin’s conclusion that because guilt is not being determined Fifth Amendment
rights are irrelevant during a certification proceeding.
Alternative interpretations of the Statute
The Court held that the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, and unconstitutional.  The State
argued that it would be possible for a juvenile overcome the presumption without incriminating himself.  The
Court rejected this argument because the statute expressly requires the juvenile to present “clear and convincing
evidence.”  The Court held that to construe the statute in a way that removed the “clear and convincing”
standard would require the Court to re-write the statute.  The Court declines to make any statutory revisions and
leaves that task to the Legislature.  Further, in adhering to Legislative intent to create exceptions, the Court held
the certification provisions unconstitutional in their entirety. 
Conclusion
 Therefore, the Court overruled part of their decision in Marvin v. State, suggesting that the right against
self-incrimination is irrelevant in juvenile proceedings.  Additionally, the Court held Nevada presumptive
certification provisions10 to be void in their entirety.
9 95 Nev. 836, (Nev. 1979).
10 NEV. REV. STAT. § 62B.390(2), NEV. REV. STAT. § 62B390(3).
